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Revisiting the Effect of Food Aid on Conflict: A Methodological Caution

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US Food Aid and Civil Conflict[†]

By NATHAN NUNN AND NANCY QIAN*

Nunn and Qian (2014) use a novel IV strategy to identify what they claim is a causal effect of US food aid deliveries on conflict in recipient countries.

Substantive contribution: “a 1,000 MT increase in US wheat aid increases the incidence of conflict by .3 percentage points.” (~+4% avg conflict incidence at sample means). Very serious.

Methodological contribution: Uses a (continuous) DID-like strategy to generate 1st stage plausibly exogenous variation in the variable of interest (food aid shipments)



The US is by far the largest global provider of food aid.

If US food aid causes conflict, further reduction of an already-controversial and diminished program might be warranted.

Sample coverage of N&Q results:

- “Cash for conflicts: New research suggests that development projects and food aid have fueled civil conflicts” (*The Economist*)
- “Please, Don’t Send Food” (*Foreign Policy*)
- “Why Food Aid Fuels International Conflict” (*Huffington Post*)

Meanwhile, UN warns that cuts to food aid are “threatening to worsen already unacceptable levels of acute malnutrition, stunting and anemia, particularly in children.”



$$(3) \quad C_{irt} = \beta F_{irt} + \mathbf{X}_{irt}\Gamma + \varphi_{rt} + \psi_{ir} + \nu_{irt},$$

$$(4) \quad F_{irt} = \alpha(P_{t-1} \times \bar{D}_{ir}) + \mathbf{X}_{irt}\Gamma + \varphi_{rt} + \psi_{ir} + \varepsilon_{irt}$$

Estimate conflict as function of (endogenous) food aid receipts, given controls, incl. region-year and country fixed effects.

Policy generates random variation: *“USDA accumulates wheat in high production years as part of its price stabilization policies. The accumulated wheat is stored and then shipped as food aid to poor countries.”* Exogenous shocks to wheat production change food aid at margin, primarily among regular food aid recipients.

Identification:

“US wheat production is associated with more conflict among regular US food aid recipients but not among irregular recipients.”



OLS results: negative, insignificant relationship b/n food aid flows and conflict. But potentially endogenous if food aid flows targeted partly on basis of conflict status (per policy).

N&Q argue that OLS estimates *downwardly* biased because food aid targeted to countries less affected by conflict (where it is least likely to cause harm).

Really? US expressly targets emergency food aid toward conflict-affected states ...

Food Aid After Fifty Years Recasting its role





Christopher B. Barrett and Daniel G. Maxwell




1. Food aid is targeted to (not away from) conflict-affected countries per USAID policy:
“[USAID Food for Peace] provides emergency food assistance to those affected by conflict and natural disasters and provides development food assistance to address the underlying causes of hunger.” (2015, emphasis added)
2. Effectively leveraging $n=36$ inter-annual observations of wheat production fluctuations ... longer-run trends may dominate year-on-year change from mechanism N&Q posit.
3. N&Q mechanism (USG wheat purchases based on price support policy) only existed for part of the period they study.




Core problem: non-parallel, nonlinear trends







The difference between regular and irregular recipients occurs solely in 1970s, during transition to period of high US wheat output and conflict.





Food aid flows are persistent, especially if a food aid spell begins in a year of conflict. Note that NQ find no effect on conflict initiation, only on duration. Endogeneity if food aid is targeted to conflict-affected countries. Persistence falls over study period, so problem greatest in 1970s, the only period when diff exists b/n regular/irregular recipients.





N&Q's policy drivers changed dramatically from 1971-2006.

1970's: CCC offered non-recourse loans. Farmers could forfeit grain to pay off loan. So as prices↓ → wheat stocks ↑. Only real fluctuations around market prices were 1981-87.

1985 Farm Bill lowered price target dramatically making forfeiture less attractive

1996 Farm Bill eliminated price targets entirely
CCC stocks of wheat completely exhausted by 2006.

Also shift from T1 to T2 PL480 food aid from 1970s-2000s

Implication:

N&Q strategy should work pre-1985, not at all post-1996.



TABLE A1: INSTRUMENT AND FOOD AID SHIPMENTS BY FARM BILL ERA

US wheat food aid (1000 MT)

Panel A: Pre-1985 (n=1,460)

Baseline interaction instrument 0.00256
(0.00175)

Panel B: 1985-1996 (n=1,245)

Baseline interaction instrument -0.00218
(0.00246)

Panel C: Post-1996 (n=1,245)

Baseline interaction instrument 0.00181
(0.00114)

BLE A2: 2SLS ESTIMATES OF FOOD AID ON CONFLICT BY FARM BILL ERA

Any conflict

Panel A: Pre-1985

U.S. wheat aid (MT) 0.00357
(0.00286)

Panel B: 1985-1996

U.S. wheat aid (MT) -0.00383
(0.00399)

Panel C: Post-1996

U.S. wheat aid (MT) 0.00294
(0.00270)

1st stage instrument becomes insignificant in relevant (pre-1985) period; 2SLS estimate unchanged (but insig).

But placebo test period (post-1996) not stat sig different from relevant (pre-1985) period.

First hint that something else at play: aid procurement policy does not drive NQ results as hypothesized.



Longer-run (nonlinear) trends in time series dominate inter-annual exog variation that drives identification. Endog. group selection plus trends could fully explain N&Q results.

Year-region/country fixed effects not adequate controls.

Placebo test: randomizing food aid flows among recipients should break link unless background trends drive correlation.

Implication:

If coefficient estimate on randomized food aid still positive and statistically significant, it's picking up something else, (i) endog. identity of regular aid recipients and (ii) spurious background trends in conflict and wheat production.



Placebo Test Method:


- Hold constant identity of aid recipients, timing and total availability of food aid, wheat production, etc.
- Randomize which country receives food aid flow each year.
- This preserves the endogenous macro time trends and the potential spurious correlation of wheat production and conflict.
- Also retains potential ORV and selection bias problems.

Implication:

If N&Q's hypothesized mechanism is true, this randomization should break correlation between food aid flows and conflict.



Dist'n of coefficient estimates from 1,000 randomizations does not center around 0. Instead, it moves rightward with no support around 0!




Implication:

(Endog.) identity of FA recipients and (nonlinear, non-parallel) background trends drive N&Q result, not the policy mechanism they posit. Indeed, randomized estimates higher, consistent w/neg OLS.



Given those results, try replicating N&Q with a clearly spurious IV with the same trend that can't possibly cause food aid flows.

We use global music cassette sales as spurious IV. Even when control for N&Q's instrument, this spurious IV generates very similar estimates (0.3%) to (not stat sig different from) N&Q's.



Take-away: Any time series variable with a spuriously similar trend yields biased IV estimates, even with lots of controls.



We construct 2 models where food aid has **no** positive effect on conflict: (i) uncorrelated, and (ii) food aid reduces conflict.

If we preserve the background trends, and $L-R$ variation $>$ $S-R$ variation in exogenous component of IV, do we estimate the same negative OLS but positive IV relationship?


In such a model, does N&Q's estimation strategy accurately reflect the true DGP?

Take-away:

Using, N&Q's strategy, we consistently replicate their findings of negative OLS estimates and positive 2SLS estimates when there is no true positive, causal effect of food aid on conflict. Even do so when food aid truly, causally **reduces** conflict.



Model 2: allow food aid to be driven partly by reasons other than conflict. Also let food aid *prevent* conflict in the true DGP.



Resulting parameter estimates for OLS and 2SLS qualitatively identical to N&Q's even though true $\beta < 0$!

Two core problems: (i) countries that experience the most conflict are most likely to get aid and (ii) conflict and wheat production are spuriously related over time.



Food aid: N&Q's findings not causal. Indeed, fully consistent w/ a model in which food aid prevents rather than causes conflict.

Methodological: Other papers use similar IV strategy: interact a plausibly exogenous time series variable with limited variation with a potentially endogenous cross-sectional variable with greater N to create continuous quasi-DID IV estimator. Be wary!

- Know true data generating process (e.g., policy) and any changes during the period
- If diff-in-diff 'treatment' is likely endogenous be very careful to look for differences in underlying trending variables. Plot data and inspect visually for non-parallel trends.
- Try placebo tests to validate exclusionary restriction



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Thank you for your interest and comments!